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1 INTRODUCTION 
Thinking about ‘fleeing to the European Union’(EU), one cannot help but 
recall the unsettling pictures of African people stranded on the crowded 
beaches of the Costa del Sol. Today, an unknown number of people in search 
of a better life still leave their home countries for a dangerous and uncertain 
trip to European shores. In their midst are refugees fleeing from violent 
conflict or fear for persecution due to their political affiliation, a particular 
faith, or color of skin, who under International Law deserve protection. But in 
order to be granted protection a refugee first needs to reach the territory of a 
foreign state to lay down a claim for asylum.  
For a person wanting to arrive in a ‘European Union Member State today 
to request asylum, there is a daunting challenge ahead’ (van Selm, 2004:3). 
Entering the EU legally poses difficulties due to travel document requirements 
hard to fulfill for a person in flight. Carriers are unwilling to take refugees on 
board for fear of getting fined for transporting ‘illegals’. And trying to reach 
territorial waters of an EU Member State, a refugee runs the risk of getting 
intercepted, by EU organization Frontex. Effectively a refugee fleeing to the 
EU might be denied the right to ever lay down a claim for asylum. But would it 
have been different had the EU not existed?  
The EU, however, does exist. And as a next step in the European 
integration project, the Treaty of Amsterdam (ToA) drafted in 1997, asylum 
and immigration policy became a central element in the development of an 
‘area of freedom, security and justice’. The ToA moved immigration and 
asylum issues from the intergovernmental third pillar, where it had been 
enshrined since the Treaty of Maastricht (1992), to the supranational first pillar 
under Title IV on visas, asylum and immigration. Simultaneously with this, in 
Brussels jargon ‘communitarization’, asylum and immigration became a ‘cross-
pillar’ issue increasingly embedded in the EU’s involvement with third 
countries. 
The development of policies at the European level is sometimes referred 
to as ‘Europeanization’. According to one Oxfam Report the Europeanization 
of immigration and asylum policy is leading to a ‘fast-moving 
internationalization’, shifting responsibility away from the EU (McKleever, 
2005:ii), against the very principles of refugee protection. One could however 
also argue that Europeanization has the potential to uphold human rights 
standards, as it brings a new policy area under the jurisdiction of the EU. Also 
the communitarization so far has been partial, resulting in a hybrid system with 
blurred competences, opt-outs and a different status for new Member States. 
This paper aims to assess to what extent this character of the Europeanization 
of asylum and immigration policy affects the right to seek refugee status in 
congruence with International Refugee Law. This research starts from the 
hypothesis that the process of Europeanization of asylum and immigration 
policy is leading to a deterioration of this right to seek refugee status. 
In order to verify this hypothesis, the first chapter will provide a 
conceptualization of the ‘right to seek refugee status’. On the basis of the UN 
Refugee Convention the right to seek refugee status will be defined as the right 
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not to be returned, nor to be rejected at the border if this means a potential 
threat to one’s life or liberty. Against this definition the Europeanization of 
immigration and asylum policies will be assessed.  
The second chapter subsequently will set out a policy analysis through the 
question: how does the nature of the Europeanization of asylum and 
immigration policy since the Treaty of Amsterdam and the steps towards a 
common immigration and asylum policy affect the right to seek refugee status? 
On the one hand the partial nature of the communitarization will be discussed 
and on the other hand the actual policies adopted relating to travel document 
requirements, carrier sanction and the transfer of responsibilities of the EU to 
‘safe’ third countries will be addressed. 
In order to explain the deteriorating effect of Europeanization on the 
protection of refugee, established in chapter two, chapter three will explore 
how the nature of the Europeanization of immigration and asylum policies can 
be understood through theories of European integration. Apart from 
addressing exogenous pressures, such as a rise in the number of asylum 
applications and functional pressures, primarily the abolition of internal 
borders, it will be argued that Europeanization of immigration and asylum 
policy can be characterized by the persistence of intergovernmentalism, 
because Member States, especially powerful ones like Germany, have been 
leading the integration process to the detriment of refugee protection. This 
intergovernmental explanation of integration will be contrasted with the 
neofunctional and constructivist assumptions of identity transformation and 
prevalence of supranational institutions, chiefly the Commission.  
Before moving on to the conclusion, the last chapter will bring forward an 
illustrative case study under the guiding question: to what extent do the 
operations of Frontex undermine the right to seek refugee status? Since 2005, 
Frontex has been the European Agency for the management of operational 
cooperation at EU’s external borders, and has chiefly been coordinating 
interception operations at sea. It will be argued that Frontex exhibits precisely 
those characteristics that have been associated with Europeanization 
throughout the rest of the paper, such as the increasing externalization of the 
refugee ‘problem’ and the neglect of refugees in  policies targeting ‘illegal’ 
immigration.  
This research aims to provide insight into the process of Europeanization 
in the area of asylum and immigration and its consequences for the 
preservation of refugee protection. Judging from the current state of world 
affairs, refugee streams, caused by the persistence of internal wars and human 
right abuses world wide, will probably remain one of the most pressing issues 
for global governance, putting a huge responsibility in the hands of the 
international community. Hence it is deemed important to assess whether and 
especially why the EU and its Member States are (not) living up to this 
responsibility of granting refugees the right to seek asylum. 
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2 THE RIGHT TO SEEK REFUGEE STATUS  
When the striking images of stranded boatpeople on a beach full of Western 
tourists reach the news sporadically, it seems to provoke an already existing 
perception that the EU is caught up in an immigration and refugee crisis. In 
reality, the vast majority of refugees worldwide remain in their region of origin. 
In 2005 from the 8.7 million world’s refugee population, 6.5 million were living 
in developing countries. Of the 2.2 million refugees that did flee to 
industrialized countries, only 260.700 asylum claims were lodged in Europe 
(UNHCR, 2007a:9). During the 1980’s and 1990’s however there was indeed a 
rapid increase in refugee movements, but this number ‘decreased sharply 
during the first years of the new millennium’ (UNHCR, 2006:16). 
In response to this increase various governments over the past fifteen 
years have introduced restrictive asylum policies like carrier sanctions, 
interceptions and ‘safe third country’ arrangements (Edwards, 2005:293). 
Several scholars and NGOs have commented that this is leading to an 
increasing deterioration of the international refugee protection regime 
(McKleever, 2005; Guild, 2006). In order for this paper to assess whether 
policy making at the European level has contributed to this global trend it 
should first be understood what the right to seek refugee status in congruence 
with International Refugee Law entails. 
Firstly, a brief explanation on the interdependent nature of immigration 
and refugee policies will be set out. Also some minimal background to the 
conclusion of the 1951 Refugee Convention will be provided. Subsequently a 
discussion of the definition the Convention assigns to refugee and the principle 
of non-refoulement will boil down to a conceptualization of the right to seek 
refugee status. Lastly the EU definition of a ‘refugee’ will be discussed.  
2.1 Refugee – Immigration Nexus 
The ‘international refugee protection regime’, referred upon in the introduction 
is ‘embodied in core legal documents such as the Refugee Convention, the 
Refugee Protocol, institutions such as the UNHCR and the International 
Organization for Migration, and prominent non-governmental organizations’ 
(Orchard, 2005:2). Such an overarching regime does not exist for migration. 
This is problematic as modern migration and refugee flows are inherently 
complex and may simultaneously contain a mix of economic migrants, genuine 
refugees and others (Lavenex and Uçarer, 2004).  Due to the complex nature 
of migratory movements, measures combating ‘illegal’ immigration will 
inevitably also affect the protection of refugees.  
In addition migration and refugee flows are a matter of high international 
interdependence, because denial of access to one country, means remaining in 
the territory of another. Hence states tend to believe that adopting liberal 
asylum policies will attract a higher number of asylum seekers at the ‘expense’ 
of the numbers flowing to neighboring countries (Lavenex and Uçarer, 
2004:425). Thus policies trying to restrict the flows of immigrants enacted by 
one state will irrevocable have its impact on other states. ‘Breaches of 
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international refugee and human rights law may encourage and legitimize 
similar trends outside the Union’ (Da Lomba, 2004:284).   
2.2 The Convention: an Inherent European Document 
Under international law the treaty governing the reception and treatment of 
refugees is the UN Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees (1951) and 
its Protocol (1967). The creation of the Convention has it origins in the 
aftermath of the Second World War, when numerous refugees were scattered 
across the European continent and asylum was to serve as a redress for the 
horrible human rights violations that had taken place (Lavenex, 2001:857). The 
Convention was Euro-centric (and anti-communist) from the onset, because 
the majority of states that drafted it were Western European. Furthermore the 
Convention was limited to events before 1951 and states were permitted to 
limit the cause for flight to European events (van Selm, 2005:4).  
After decolonization set in, more non-European states started to become 
party to the Convention and through the adoption of 1967 Protocol the 
abovementioned temporal and geographical limitations were lifted (Da Lomba, 
2004:4). A total of 146 states nowadays have ratified one or both of the UN 
instruments. Furthermore, most norms of Convention and Protocol have 
developed into customary law. Regardless, all, including the new EU Member 
States are party to the 1951 Convention and its Protocol. It is ironic that 
precisely those states that initiated the drafting of the Refugee Convention now 
seem to be failing in their commitments, as ‘many consider that there has been 
a resiling over the past two decades among the original Member States of the 
Union from their commitment to provide protection on their territory for 
persons fleeing persecution’ (Guild, 2006:630). 
2.3 Refugees, Non-refoulement and the Right to Seek 
Refugee Status 
The legal definition of a refugee, is enshrined in article 1 (A) (2) of the 
Convention:  
For the purposes of the present Convention, the term ‘refugee’ shall apply to any 
person who (…) owing to a well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of 
race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political 
opinion, is outside the country of his nationality and is unable or, owing to such 
fear, is unwilling to avail himself of the protection of that country;[…]  
For the purpose of this paper, the most important characteristic derived 
from this article is that a refugee must have fled across the border of the 
country he is fleeing from, in order to be eligible for refugee status (Goodwin-
Gill, 1985:240). No reservations are allowed to be made to article 1. 
Nevertheless states can adhere to additional grounds on the basis of which 
they assign the refugee status or another form of protection.  
Although it is important to understand who constitutes a refugee under 
international law, this paper is rather concerned with whether a supposed 
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refugee is granted the possibility to claim to be in need of international 
protection. For this purpose, the central concept that arrives from the 
Convention is that of non-refoulement enshrined in article 33(1) on the 
‘Prohibition of Expulsion or Return’ (“Refoulement”): 
No Contracting State shall expel or return (“refouler”) a refugee in any manner 
whatsoever to the frontiers of territories where his life or freedom would be 
threatened on account of his race, religion, nationality, membership of a 
particular social group or political opinion. 
The only ground for violating this principle of non-refoulement is when a 
state has reasonable grounds to believe that the refugee constitutes a danger to 
the security of the country and certainly not that someone is suspected of 
being ‘bogus’ (art.33(2)). Article 33 is one of the two articles for which 
reservations are proscribed. 
Particularly important is the reference to ‘frontiers of territories’. UNHCR 
has emphasized that ‘the different wording (…) make[s] it clear the principle of 
non-refoulement applies not only in respect of the country of origin but to any 
country where a person has reason to fear persecution’ (in: Da Lomba, 2004:5). 
Indirectly this also includes ‘chain refoulement’, which occurs when a refugee is 
transferred back to a ‘safe’ country that subsequently sends the refugee back to 
the country where his life or freedom is threatened (McKleever et al, 2005: ix). 
The principle of non-refoulement has developed into a norm of customary 
international law (Goodwin-Gill, 1985:99). The Convention also included an 
article on the means of entry, which maintains that Contracting States shall not 
impose penalties on the illegal entry or presence of refugees (art.31(1)). The 
Convention is however silent on the issue of rejection when refugees present 
themselves at the borders of a state before entry. Nevertheless, ‘by and large, 
states in their practice and in their recorded views have recognized that [non-
refoulement] applies to the moment at which asylum-seekers present themselves 
for entry […thus] the concept now encompasses both non-rejection and non-
return’ (Goodwin-Gill, 1985:77, see also Rijpma and Cremona, 2007). Can we 
infer from this conceptualization of non-refoulement that a right to seek asylum 
exists?  
Although ‘asylum seeker’ is often used synonymic to refugee, they 
constitute distinct, although vastly overlapping categories. Whereas a refugee is 
someone fulfilling the criteria of the Convention with or without having 
declared himself to an authority, the status of asylum seeker is of declaratory 
nature; an asylum seeker is ‘someone who has applied for asylum and is waiting 
for the authorities to determine whether or not he or she will be recognized as 
a refugee or given another form of protection’ (McKleever et al, 2005:vii).  
Although ‘the right to seek asylum’ itself is enshrined in the 1948 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights (art.14), there are no corresponding 
duties on the part of states to accept that people land on their territory (van 
Selm and Cooper, 2006:48). Thus the right to grant asylum remains an act of 
state sovereignty. Nevertheless ‘some commentators assert that, although there 
is no right to be ‘granted’ asylum de jure, there may exist an implied right to 
asylum de facto, or, at the very least, a right to apply for it’ (Edwards, 
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2005:300). Such an implied right to seek asylum can be deduced from the 
above analysis of the concept of non-refoulement. However, this access to asylum 
procedure can only be embarked upon once the person fleeing has reached 
foreign territory. As such the right to seek refugee status is not a universal 
human right that can be relied upon anywhere, but rather as a procedural right, 
that should be granted once someone presents himself to the authorities of a 
foreign state. In addition, because the right to grant asylum remains a sovereign 
act of state, potential asylum seekers might be transferred to a ‘safe’ third 
country, as long as ‘a state proposing to remove a refugee or asylum seeker 
undertakes a proper assessment as to whether the third country concerned is 
indeed safe’ and will grant access to a refugee determination procedure 
(Lauterpacht and Bethlehem, 2003:122). 
2.4 Refugees and the EU - the Qualification Directive  
Although the next chapter will embark upon the legislation adopted by the EU 
in the field of asylum and immigration, the ‘Qualification’ Directive 
(2004/83/EC) adopted in 2004 will be analyzed here, because of its 
importance for the European conceptualization of a ‘refugee’. The Directive 
describes among other things ‘the minimum standards for the qualification and 
status of third country nationals’. The Directive for the most part follows the 
definition of the Convention, but adds two positive dimensions, that are now 
binding upon all Member States, except for Denmark which has opted out.  
Firstly, the Directive moves beyond the scope of the Convention by 
including persecution of a gender-specific nature (art.9.2(f)), meaning that 
female asylum seekers ‘with a well-founded fear of, for example, sexual 
violence […], female genital mutilation or forced prostitution [...]will now be 
entitled to refugee status across the EU’ (McKleever et al, 2005:22).  Secondly, 
also beyond the scope of the Convention, is the inclusion of non-state actors 
as possible agents of persecution (art.6(c)). Both these provisions however will 
become meaningless if refugees are prevented from lodging a claim in the EU, 
to be discussed in the next chapter.  
On the other hand, the Directive under consideration also contains a 
clause bearing the danger of refoulement, because it regards ‘parties or 
organisations, including international organisations, controlling the State or a 
substantial part of the territory of the State’ (art.7(1(b)) as potential actors for 
protection. However ‘quasi-state entities controlling part of a territory are 
often, by their very nature, temporary and unstable, as has been seen in 
Somalia’ (McKleever et al, 2005:22). Thus the danger of refoulement remains.  
2.5 Conclusion 
It has been argued that the 1951 Refugee Convention as the cornerstone of the 
international refugee protection regime has been a European creation from the 
onset that gradually developed into international customary law. It is ironic that 
precisely those states responsible for the creation of the protection regime are 
now reported as not fulfilling their obligations under the Convention. Due to 
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the interdependent nature of the refugee regime and the interconnectedness of 
immigration and refugee policies, it seems likely that more restrictive asylum 
and immigration policies at EU-level will legitimize a multiplier effect into non-
EU territory undermining the right to seek refugee status on a global scale.  
Arriving from article 31 on irregular entry and article 33 on the principle 
of non-refoulement, as well as from customary law, the ‘right to seek refugee 
status’ has been defined as the protection of the principle of non-refoulement, 
including both non-return and non-rejection and thus the right of access to an 
individual and fair refugee determination procedure. In order to embark on 
this right, asylum seekers need to be territorial present and might be 
transferred to a safe third country provided that they are granted the possibility 
to lodge a claim for asylum there. 
The next chapter will analyze to what extent the process of 
Europeanization has affected this right to seek refugee status. In this chapter 
the Qualification Directive has already been put forward as slightly positive by 
providing protection for gender-based and non-state actor persecution and 
very negative by regarding non-state agents as a potential source for protection, 
which are likely only to be able to grant temporary protection. 
3 EUROPEANIZATION AND THE RIGHT TO SEEK REFUGEE 
STATUS 
In the previous chapter it was concluded that a ‘right to seek refugee status’ 
can be inferred from the 1951 Convention, meaning that anyone presenting 
him- or herself at or within European borders should be granted an individual 
and fair refugee determination procedure without being returned, or rejected 
before entry. The commitments to the Convention have been repeatedly 
reaffirmed in documents of EU-institutions. And yet human rights 
organizations are accusing ‘European governments and institutions […to] 
continue to scale back rights protections for asylum seekers and migrants’ 
(McKleever et al, 2005:14). 
With the Treaty of Amsterdam (ToA) asylum issues became 
communitarized, while simultaneously the EU embarked upon a ‘cross-pillar 
approach’, by enshrining asylum and immigration into its dealings with third 
countries. Whether the ‘scaling back of rights protection’ can to a certain 
extent be traced back to the process of Europeanization will be discussed 
through the following question: how does the nature of the Europeanization of 
asylum and immigration policy since the ToA and the steps taken towards a 
common immigration and asylum policy affect the right to seek refugee status? 
To conduct the analysis, a conceptualization of Europeanization will be 
put forward first. Moreover, some historical background will be provided on 
the development towards a common European asylum and immigration policy. 
Subsequently the first part of the analysis will address the way in which the 
nature of the communitarization process itself, which has only been partial, 
might affect the right to seek refugee status. The second part of the analysis 
will look into the policy-steps that have been taken, such as visa policies and 
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carrier sanctions. The third part will look at the increasing externalization of 
asylum and immigration policies.  
3.1 Europeanization – a Multi-faced Process 
The concept of Europeanization has recently gained currency amongst 
scholars of the European Union. And yet no consensus seems to exist as to 
what the concept entails. Originally the term Europeanization was adopted as a 
top-down perspective to analyze the influence of EU-level policies on the 
institutional structure and policies of the various Member States. Although this 
perspective is still the most dominant approach in the literature (Faist and Ette, 
2007), the breadth of the term has been extended and Europeanization is now 
‘a newly fashionable term to denote a variety of changes within European 
politics’, describing a multi-faced process that is ‘variously affecting actors and 
institutions, ideas and interests’ (Featherstone, 2003:3) across and beyond the 
EU. Furthermore, the concept, in contrast with the notion of European 
integration, denotes ‘dynamism, imbroglio and limits to determinism in present 
day Europe’ (Featherstone, 2003:19). It is precisely because of this ‘imbroglio’, 
that ‘Europeanization’ is relevant to use as an analytical lens because the 
communitarization of asylum and immigration policy has only been partial.  
Europeanization throughout the paper will be conceptualized in its most 
minimalist sense as the responses to and effects of policies of the EU 
(Featherstone, 2003:3). Within the literature, a variety of taxonomies of the 
various dimensions of Europeanization exist (see for example: Wong, 2005; 
Olsen, 2003; Featherstone, 2003). For the purpose of this paper I would like to 
elaborate on three of these dimensions. 
3.1.1 Europeanization as: developing institutions and policies at 
the European level  
The first dimension is closest to the concept of ‘European integration’, where 
Europeanization denotes the development of institutions and policies at the 
European level. Disagreements exist among scholars as to what or who leads 
this process, which will be discussed in chapter three. Radaelli simply calls this 
‘direct Europeanization’: ‘where regulatory competence has passed from the 
member states to the European Union’ (in Wong, 2005:139). 
Communitarization is the most comprehensive form of Europeanization of 
this nature, but the regulatory competence might also be of intergovernmental 
and even informal nature. For the purposes of this paper this will be the most 
relevant level of analysis of Europeanization as it is precisely the case with 
asylum and immigration policies that regulatory competences were (partially) 
passed to EU institutions. However, policies enacted at the European level are 
likely to have a different impact on various member states, as well as an impact 
outside the EU-territory, hence two other dimensions of Europeanization are 
looked at. 
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3.1.2 Europeanization as:  domestic impacts of European-level 
institutions  
As mentioned above, most frequently Europeanization is understood as the 
reverberations of EU-level policies on domestic institutions and policies. 
European level development may have direct and indirect as well as intended 
and unintended domestic impacts. Radaelli for example refers to ‘indirect 
Europeanization’ where member states ‘begin to imitate and adjust to each 
others policies as a consequence of Europeanization in other areas’ (in: Wong, 
2005:139). This may lead to a de-facto harmonization of policies.  
Policies enacted at the European level in general are likely to impact 
various national settings differently, because ‘the (West) European political 
order is characterized by long, strong and varied institutional histories’ 
(Rokkan, 1999 in: Olsen, 2002:934). Most authors do account for the domestic 
impact of Europeanization as a process of ‘diversity and asymmetry’ being 
‘refracted, translated, and edited in various guises by domestic political systems’ 
(Featherstone and Radaelli, 2003:336). However, hardly anyone writes about 
the anti-European effects policies stemming from EU-institutions may have on 
the continuation of the deeper integration of Europe, in the event that states 
act defensively. This paper will illustrate that certain policies outlined at EU-
level may lead to what I would like to call de-Europeanization in other 
respects, implying ‘that national policies and politics become less "European" 
than they were’ (Faist and Ette, 2007:18).  
3.1.3 The external dimension of Europeanization  
The third dimension of Europeanization as externalization refers to the extra-
territorial effects European integration can have when its dynamics are 
extended beyond EU-boundaries, which might be the intended or unintended 
result of actions on behalf of the EU. For example, third countries might 
autonomously respond to (negative) externalities of EU policies like ‘rising 
numbers of asylum seekers as a consequence of tighter controls at the EU’s 
external borders’ (Lavenex and Uçarer, 2004:421). Third countries may also be 
affected in a context of external Community actions, where the consent of this 
third state is needed, for example in the case of operations in the territorial 
waters of third states, to be discussed in chapter four. For the purpose of this 
research this externalization constitutes an important dimension, because the 
right to seek refugee status inevitably involves third countries, or at least third 
country nationals.  
3.2 Historical Background  
3.2.1 Intergovernmental cooperation 
Before the EU was formally established in 1992, asylum and immigration 
issues had played a non-existing role in the integration process (Guild, 
2006:633). With the ratification of the Treaty of Maastricht, the EU, as a single 
market with free movement of goods, persons, services and capital was 
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created. However, one category was excluded from the free-movement-mantra, 
as ‘an exception to the logic of territorial integration [was] created out of the 
bodies of refugees’ (Guild, 2006:637). 
With the Treaty of Maastricht, the ‘European integration project’ moved 
beyond mere economic issues as the dismantling of borders also required 
cooperation in other fields. Hence the pillar structure was created (see figure 
3.1). The first pillar (the European Communities (EC) pillar) is the only 
supranational pillar and remains the core of the European Union dealing 
mainly with economic, as well as related social and environmental policies. The 
second pillar came to deal with EU’s external relations under the name 
Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP). Asylum and Immigration 
became enshrined in the third pillar called Justice and Home Affairs (JHA). 
When Amsterdam in 1997 moved asylum and immigration policy to the first 
pillar, the third pillar was renamed into Police and Justice Cooperation in 
Criminal matters (PJCC). 
The difference between the first and the other two pillars lies primarily in 
the mode of decision making. The first pillar is characterized by 
supranationality, where Member States have partially transferred sovereignty, 
which will be discussed in the coming paragraphs. Decisions in the other two 
pillars are still predominantly intergovernmental and thus enacted on the basis 
of unanimity. The powers of the European Parliament, the Commission and 
the European Court of Justice in these two pillars are fairly limited. 
The only two initiatives at European level in the field of asylum that 
existed before the Treaty of Maastricht were enacted outside the framework of 
the European Community. In 1985, the Schengen Agreement on the Gradual 
Abolition of Checks at the Common Borders was signed, but only in the 
follow-up Treaty in 1990 (Schengen II) were measures included relating to 
third country nationals and asylum seekers. Also an Ad Hoc Working Group 
on Immigration was established in 1986, which created the Dublin Convention 
(1990) that established the criteria for determining the Member State 
responsible for examining an asylum application. After the ToA, both Dublin 
and Schengen became Community Law under the first pillar. With the Treaty 
of Maastricht (1992), the cooperation on immigration and asylum policies 
became formalized under the third pillar, but not much progress was made and 
only in the form of non-binding instruments (Rees, 2005:215). 
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FIGURE 3.1 
Pillar structure of the European Union 
 
Source: Website Carleton University  
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3.2.2 Uneasy communitarization  
With the ToA, asylum and immigration became ‘communitarized’ under the 
new Title IV on ‘Visa, Asylum, Immigration and other policies related to free 
movement of persons’. Also the Schengen Agreement was incorporated into 
the acquis communitaire, the total body of EU law. However, three states, the 
UK, Ireland and Denmark, chose to remain outside of Title IV and the 
Schengen provisions (Rees, 2005:216). The ten New Member States that 
acceded to the Union in 2004 and the two in 2007 were on the other hand 
obliged to adopt the full acquis. Also a transitional period of five years was set 
during which decisions would still be taken by unanimity of the Council. So 
although under the first pillar the Council could now adopt binding legislation, 
the policy area did not become communitarized in terms of decision making. 
What the ToA did positively specify for the first time was that all measures 
must be in accordance with the Geneva Convention and its Protocol 
(art.63(1)). 
After the ToA came into force, the major aims and principles of the 
common asylum policy were agreed upon in October 1999 at the European 
Council in Tampere (Finland). It was decided that in the long run one common 
European Asylum System (CEAS) was to be established. In order to 
accomplish this, the first stage was to harmonize the Member States ‘legal 
frameworks on the basis of common minimum standards before May 2004’ 
(European Commission, 2007). Common minimum standards in particular 
were to be adopted concerning procedures, reception conditions, responsibility 
designation and the definition of a refugee. A shift away from unanimity was 
made conditional upon agreements on these minimum standards. In 
November 2004, as a follow-up The Hague Programme was agreed to, which 
amongst other things called ‘for the continued integration of migration into the 
EU’s external relations’. Below it will be analyzed how this specific character of 
Europeanization as centre-building, with only partial communitarization, opt-
outs, and a transitional period of five years influences policies affecting the 
right to seek refugee status. 
3.3 Europeanization as Developing Institutions at the 
European Level – Partial Communitarization 
Amsterdam meant that the policy area of immigration and asylum, originally 
belonging to the sovereignty of the individual member states, now fell under 
the competence of the Community. In theory, the transfer of competences to 
the Community pillar could ‘facilitate the adoption and ensure the application 
of measures in line with international refugee and human rights law’ (Da 
Lomba, 2004:36) for several reasons. Firstly, under the first pillar a much larger 
role is enshrined for both the Commission and the European Parliament (EP), 
which both had been expressing ‘concern about the protection of the right to 
seek refugee status’ (Da Lomba, 2004:36). The Commission, the executive arm 
of the Union, under the first pillar holds the exclusive right of initiative to 
submit proposals to the Council, the legislative arm, existing depending on the 
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topic of one national minister per state. The EP is granted the right to co-
decide, which ensures a higher degree of democratic control over EU-
legislation. Secondly, a major difference is that decisions taken under the first 
pillar are binding. ‘Hence, provided that EC standards in the field of asylum 
comply with international refugee and human rights law, the community offers 
a more effective system as it imposes more stringent obligations and 
constraints on the Member States’ (Da Lomba, 2004:36). This binding nature 
of legislation is reinforced by the role of European Court of Justice (ECJ) that 
has the competence under the first pillar to check Member States on their 
implementation and interpretation of adopted EC-legislation. Lastly, the 
normal method of decision making in the Council is Qualified Majority Voting 
(QMV)2. Except for speeding up the decision process, QMV also minimizes 
the need for compromise. Many authors make the argument that decision 
making by unanimity leads to the adoption of the lowest common 
denominator, because all states need to accept the proposed legislation (van 
Selm, 2005; Lavenex, 2001). 
As mentioned above, the transfer of asylum and immigration policies to 
the first pillar meant a breach with the traditional first pillar decision making, 
with the provision of a transition period. Although transitional periods are not 
uncommon in the European integration process, it was uncommon that 
unanimity prevailed in the first pillar and that in addition the shift to QMV was 
made conditional on the prior adoption of minimum standards (Lavenex, 
2001:65). This shift only took place after more than six years, in December 
2005. This conservation of the unanimity bore the risk that ‘the foundations of 
a common European asylum system endorse the lowest standards in force in 
the Union, thus threatening compliance with international law’ (Da Lomba 
2004:43). The adoption of a lowest common denominator also bears the risk, 
due to the interdependent nature of the refugee protection regime, that states 
with a more liberal asylum law will also lower their standards. This risk of 
‘harmonizing down’ might also happen de-facto when, as a spillover effect of 
the abolition of internal borders, states begin to emulate each others practices 
(McKleever et al, 2005:21). 
Oxfam and Amnesty, as well as other NGOs and scholars, are 
outspokenly negative in their evaluation of EU efforts to create a common 
asylum system. Amnesty comments that ‘harmonization through minimum 
standards has produced outcomes that in some cases do little more than 
catalogue national practice and on key issues contravene international refugee 
and human rights law’ (2004:1).  
Thus prima facie, the common perception that unanimity voting leads to 
the adoption of the lowest standards seems to hold true. Two reservations 
                                                 
2 Qualified majority voting is a system of voting in the Council, which requires a 
decision to receive a set number of votes (each member state has a certain number of 
votes, weighted broadly on the basis of population), and is agreed by a majority of 
members. 
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however need to be made. Firstly, in chapter one it was concluded that the 
Qualification Directive adopted a definition of refugee going beyond the 
Convention’s definition by including ‘gender-based’ persecution and 
persecution by non-state actors as valid grounds for protection, while these 
grounds had certainly not been embedded in some of the national refugee laws 
of EU-states (Lavenex, 2001:861). Even Amnesty welcomed the Directive on 
its wide scope of application (2004). However, the Directive should not be 
celebrated too much if other measures in the field of asylum will turn it into a 
dead letter.  
A second, more substantive reservation is that unanimity can also be used 
by more liberal states to prevent ‘stricter collective action’ (Antoniou, 2003). A 
telling example is the proposal by the United Kingdom to create Transit 
Processing Centers (TPC) ‘to be located in countries bordering the EU that are 
transited by people who might claim asylum in EU member states’ (Schuster, 
2005:1). This would be a severe deterioration of the right to seek refugee 
status, as asylum seekers effectively will be denied entry to the jurisdiction of 
contracting states to the Convention. Nevertheless, this proposal seemed to 
enjoy widespread support among member states. Sweden however, was able to 
block the proposal from the start, later joined amongst others by Spain and 
France (Schuster, 2005:9). 
Following from this example it seems that the advocates against unanimity 
voting are forgetting that through a shift to QMV certain Member States might 
become more powerful. According to Antoniou QMV ‘will only facilitate the 
adoption of acts satisfying the majority of the bigger states like Germany, 
France, Spain and UK. What would help, is efficient judicial control on policies 
of the EU and a role for the European Parliament’ (Antoniou, 2003). Since 
December 2005, the EP has indeed been granted this right of co-decision. The 
right of ECJ however remains severely circumscribed, as it can only give a 
ruling when a case is pending before a court of a Member State against whose 
decisions there is no judicial remedy under national law. Up until now no case 
law has been produced under Title IV relating to asylum seekers. Hence the 
process of Europeanization, even if QMV prevails might work to the 
detriment of refugee protection, if no adequate safeguards by the ECJ and EP 
are in place and if the preferences of bigger Member States are in favour of 
stringent asylum policies. Concerning the latter, in chapter three it will be 
illustrated that indeed the preferences of bigger states have prevailed at the 
detriment of refugees, although through unanimity, not QMV. 
To conclude this section, it can be argued that a process of dirty 
communitarization has been taking place, where ‘community’s instruments are 
used in the framework of intergovernmental decision-making with the main 
objective being the adoption of minimum standards’ (Antoniou, 2003), leading 
to a deterioration of the refugee protection. 
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3.4 Europeanization as Domestic Impact  
3.4.1 Opt-outs and new member states 
The second dimension of Europeanization described in the analytical 
framework was the domestic impact of EU-developments. So how were 
different Member States affected by this ‘dirty communitarization’?  
Ironically the proposal for Title IV found its origin in a proposal by 
Ireland that together with the United Kingdom (UK) and Denmark eventually 
decided not to take part.3 The main consequence of these opt-outs is ‘the risk 
of political and legal fragmentation [that] may impede the development of a 
comprehensive and coherent asylum policy’ (Da Lomba, 2004:40). The effect 
on the right to seek refugee status however is not self-evident, and would 
require in depth study of the three countries opting out, which lies outside the 
scope of this paper. 
More illustrative of the uneven impact of Europeanization is its influence 
on the new Member States, who ‘were required to adopt all decisions made 
prior to their accession as part of the EU acquis’ including the Schengen 
agreement. Traditionally, the Central and Eastern European Countries (CEEC) 
had not been major refugee countries, and as such did not have well-developed 
asylum systems. They were however seen as important transit countries for 
asylum seekers trying to make their way to Western Europe. Hence, for (some 
of) the EU-15 it was critical that the New Member States would adhere to the 
same restrictive standards they did in order to prevent immigrants and refugees 
‘penetrating’ the EU through porous Eastern borders (Hélène, 2007:2). 
In one respect the Europeanization of the CEECs was slightly positive, 
because the new Member States were required to sign the Geneva Convention 
and the European Convention on Human Rights. On the other hand, most of 
the policies adopted on a European level were of a restrictive nature and thus 
the stage set for the newly created asylum systems in the CEECs was restrictive 
from the start. The extension of the process of Europeanization through 
conditionality can thus be said to have had a detrimental impact on the 
protection of refugees.   
A case in point for the effect of this prescriptive Europeanization is 
Poland, where the amendments of the Alien Act in 2001 and 2003 enshrined 
European immigration policies, like temporary residence permits, carrier 
sanctions and the safe third country concept. In addition, ideas and discourses 
of the political elite were also Europeanized as ‘the perception of uncontrolled 
immigration as a threat and the ‘fortress Europe’ approach have been 
effectively transferred to the Polish ground notwithstanding the small numbers 
of immigrants in Poland’ (Faist and Ette, 2007:26). 
                                                 
3 These opt-outs are not absolute. The UK and Ireland can decide to opt-in into discussions 
and accept Title IV measures. In addition Ireland can also decide unilaterally to renounce its 
Protocol, just as Denmark. 
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3.4.2 Harmonizing down and de-Europeanization 
Many authors have commented that the adoption of standards at the lowest 
common denominator ‘has helped limit liberal regimes in traditional refugee-
receiving countries’ (Lavenex, 2001:861).  In addition the disappearance of 
internal borders is also said to lead to de facto harmonization. Yet no 
systematic analysis exists on the development of national asylum and 
immigration policies in Member States since Amsterdam. Such a comparative 
analysis of national adaptation of EU-asylum policy also lies outside the scope 
of this paper, so just some illustrative material has to suffice.  
France and Germany, arguably the driving forces behind cooperation in 
asylum matters, and certainly the two most influential states, both 
fundamentally altered their asylum system during the 1990’s. In both countries 
‘the advocates of restrictive reforms managed to reframe the domestic asylum 
problem into one of negative redistribution in a ‘porous’ Europe passoire’ 
(Lavenex, 2001:862). Hence assisted by the development at EU-level both 
national constitutions were amended in a restrictive sense. Post and Niemann 
argue that Germany was able to adopt a more restrictive constitution by 
downloading a ‘security oriented European policy’ (2007:2). The restrictive 
nature of the new constitution is mainly expressed in the institutionalization of 
the “safe third country rule”, to be discussed below. 
Although it might be premature to draw general conclusion based on 
these examples, it is quite illustrative that the two biggest states, of which 
Germany was traditionally known as a fairly liberal country, have been 
harmonizing down. Coupled with the general perception by many authors, it 
seems reasonable to conclude that at least Europeanization has been 
instrumental in lowering standards for refugee protection.4  
But not only has the adoption of the lowest common standard led to 
downward harmonization, also instances of de-Europeanization, ‘where the 
preferences of the national government are in contradiction to the 
development of European immigration policy’ can be unravelled (Faist and 
Ette, 2007:18). Especially the Dublin system that led to a redistribution of 
asylum seekers by default has had this de-Europeanizing effect (Lavenex, 
2001). The Dublin Regulation ((EC)343/2003) does not provide for a burden 
sharing mechanism, but instead provides rules to determine which state is 
responsible for dealing with an asylum application, whilst simultaneously 
preventing multiple applications in several Member States. The Regulation 
determines amongst other things that the Member State through which the 
asylum seeker entered the territory irregularly (art.10) will be responsible for its 
application. As asylum seekers have hardly any possibility to obtain access to 
the EU legally, entry into the EU will almost always be irregular. Thus these 
provisions place a disproportionate responsibility on the states at the external 
                                                 
4 For other case studies on the domestic impact of Europeanization on immigration 
and asylum systems see: Faist and Ette (2007), e.g. on Germany and UK. 
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borders of the Union, resulting de facto ‘in additional burdens on Member States 
that have limited reception and absorption capacities and that find themselves 
under particular migratory pressures because of their geographical location’ 
(European Commission, 2007:10).  
What Italy and Malta call a ‘European’ problem has, thanks to this regulation, 
reverted to being clearly their national problem […] in some senses this is a 
paradoxical and counter-intuitive result of deepening European integration (van 
Selm and Cooper, 2006:47/59). 
In the absence of European burden-sharing-mechanism, border states 
have started to make their own arrangements to ‘relieve’ their disproportionate 
burden. A case in point is Italy, which has independently sought to sign 
readmission agreements with various Maghreb states, most strikingly with 
Libya, that is not a party to the Geneva Convention, nor has a functioning 
asylum system (Baldwin-Edwards, 2006:320). Sending back supposed-to-be 
‘illegal’ immigrants to Libya, without a fair refugee determination procedure, 
could result in violating the principle of non-refoulement, which is what happened 
in Lampedusa in October 2004, when ‘Italy returned 1.000 people, without 
allowing them to claim asylum, to Libya, which in turn deported them to Egypt 
and Nigeria’ (Schuster, 2005:12). Unfortunately this example is not an 
incidence but a repeated practice also reported to be conducted by amongst 
others Spain and Malta (see for example: Selm and Cooper, 2006; McKleever, 
2005). 
3.5 The External Impact of Europeanization  
Except for the Dublin Regulation and the Qualification Directive already 
discussed, this section will look at the most important policies the EU has set 
out affecting the right to seek refugee status.  
3.5.1 Limitation of access to EU territory  
As explained in chapter one, measures aimed at combating irregular migration, 
might ‘undermine the right to seek refugee status by hampering access to the 
EU and its asylum procedures’ (Da Lomba, 2004:106). The prime example of 
this ‘hampering’ of access is interception at sea, to be discussed in chapter four. 
Other measures hampering access might include travel document requirements 
and carrier sanctions. 
One of the first Regulation adopted under Title IV concerned visa for 
stays not exceeding three months ((EC)539/2001). It should be noted that of 
all people, persons in need of international protection are in the worst position 
for obtaining these kinds of documents (Tekofsky, 2006:11). And although the 
Regulation provides for a list of exceptions for visa requirements, no reference 
is made to asylum seekers or the Geneva Convention. Because the right to seek 
refugee status cannot be called upon extra-territorially, visa requirements are 
not a breach of international refugee law, but ‘only’ make it more difficult for 
asylum seekers to seek protection. 
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In addition, carrier sanctions aggravate the need for valid travel 
documents. These sanctions penalize carriers that transport passengers not 
adequately documented when crossing the external borders of the Union (Da 
Lomba, 2004:112). In the Schengen agreement, it was already enshrined that 
carriers bringing in aliens that are refused entry are obliged to assume 
responsibility for them, by either returning them home or to a third state 
(art.26). To supplement this provision, the Council adopted a Directive 
(2001/51/EC) to harmonize the financial penalties imposed by the Member 
States on carriers who breach their obligations, when the carrier refuses to take 
‘the alien’ back on board, or the State of destination refuses entry and have the 
alien send back (art.2(a)(b)). Fines now rank between 3.000 and 5.000 Euro. 
It is positive that the Directive at least mentions that its application is 
without prejudice to the obligations resulting from the 1951 Convention and 
that fines shall not be imposed if the third country national seeks international 
protection. In effect however, the Regulation means a privatization of border 
control where responsibility to (pre)determine whether someone is eligible for 
asylum is shifted to border guards or carrier personnel. However, ‘such 
persons are unlikely to be trained in refugee law, and are certainly 
unaccountable for their actions under international law’ (McKleever et al, 
2005:38). Also, the principle of non-refoulement might be violated, when carriers 
are returning third country nationals whose applications have not been 
properly considered.  
Although both visa policies and carrier sanction were not new before it 
became a European competence to make legislation on these issues, through 
the process of Europeanization these practices became binding upon all 
Member States, thus limiting room to adhere to a more liberal visa system or to 
the non-application of fines for carriers. The combined effect of visa 
requirements and carrier sanctions make it nearly impossible for asylum seeker 
to enter the Union regularly.  
3.5.2 Limitation of access to asylum procedures  
Once asylum seekers have managed to reach European shores, legally or 
illegally, they should be granted access to a fair status-determination procedure. 
Member States can transfer this responsibility to each other through the 
Dublin system, which is already a highly questionable practice in the absence of 
harmonized rules on granting asylum. In addition, external transfers of 
responsibility to ‘safe third countries’ outside of the EU also take place.  
The safe third country principle maintains that an asylum seeker is denied 
a substantive determination procedure if the person in question has traveled 
through a deemed safe country where he could have requested refugee 
protection. The principle was included in the Procedure Directive 
(2005/85/EC). The application of the concept is not necessarily in breach with 
Refugee Law, as long as a proper assessment is undertaken as to whether the 
third country concerned is indeed safe. But the Directive adopted goes even 
further by denying access to a procedure all together. In case of a ‘super-safe 
third country’, Member States should be granted: 
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the possibility not to examine an application for asylum and send the person to a 
‘supersafe’ third country through which he/she has traveled […if] the third country 
observes the Refugee Convention and the European Convention on Human 
Rights and has in place an asylum procedure prescribed by law (EU JHA 
Website). 
Although the super-safe country concept has included the Geneva 
standards in its formulation, it is problematic that the Directive does not 
provide for any obligation to conduct regular updates on the safety of a third 
country. Apart from the idea that a country can be deemed safe for anyone is 
contentious, ‘"safe" places may [also] become rapidly "unsafe"‘ (McKleever et 
al, 2005:25-26), it may be even more important that the principle also leads to 
an unfair "externalization" of migratory pressure on neighbouring countries 
with less resources and less developed asylum systems (Post and Niemann, 
2007:31). 
The Procedure Directive provides for a common binding list to be 
adopted, but no proposal has come forward from the Commission yet. 
Regardless, the principle has already become firmly embedded in EU-
discourse, which led Member States to embed it in their national law, as was 
already exemplified by the case of Poland. However, a safe third country rule is 
only relevant when the ´safe-third states’ in question admit the nationals (back) 
onto their territory, hence the need for readmission agreements. 
3.6 Externalization 
Several authors have noted that the external dimension has rapidly developed 
into the most important aspect of a ‘common refugee policy’, leading to a shift 
of responsibility for asylum seekers to third countries (Rijpma and Cremona, 
2007). In other words, the EU is trying to ‘keep them out’ or ‘send them back’ 
using every possible means. The sending back of individuals can happen by 
means of readmission agreements or clauses. Readmission agreements are legal 
instruments that require a state party to readmit its own nationals and 
sometimes also third country nationals at the request of another state party. 
Readmission agreements existed bilaterally before the EU did, but since 
Amsterdam the Community was granted the competence to conclude 
readmission agreements alongside Member States. During the Seville Council 
in 2002 this competence was taken a step further by demanding that each 
future EU association or cooperation agreement should include a clause on 
joint management of migration flows and compulsory readmission in the event 
of ‘illegal’ immigration. 
In essence, readmission measures are aimed at combating unauthorized 
immigration, but in doing so often fail to provide for the specific 
circumstances of asylum seekers. ‘They are symptomatic of a trend that 
consists in addressing asylum issues through the lens of migration control to 
the detriment of refugee protection’ (Da Lomba, 2004:153/154). In the first 
three readmission agreements with Hong Kong, Sri Lanka and Macao, only 
reference is made to ‘without prejudice to the rights, obligations and 
responsibilities’ of the parties arising from ‘International Law’, but there is no 
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specific reference to human rights or refugee law (Peers, 2004). More 
worrisome, in the absence of refugee protection clauses, is the type of 
countries the EU is negotiating its agreements with, like Libya, China, Tunisia, 
Morocco and Syria (EU website). All the while the EU itself has for example 
acknowledged that Morocco does not have a functioning asylum system 
(Baldwin-Edwards, 2006:321). 
More striking even are the far-reaching rules on readmission in the fight 
against irregular migration enshrined in the Cotonou Agreements with the 
ACP-countries (African, Caribbean, Pacific). Although those countries 
successfully blocked the obligation to readmit third country nationals, they are 
obliged to take back their own residents (Lavenex and Uçarer, 2004:434). Not 
only are these among the poorest countries of the world, but they also tend to 
produce refugees in need of protection, such as countries like Somalia and the 
Democratic Republic of Congo. 
Europeanization as the reverberation of EU-policy making on third 
countries, in the case of readmission agreements, seems to be led by 
conditionality linking EU-aid to matters of asylum (Rees, 2005:215). In case a 
third state fails to meet its readmission requirements, the EU threatens that 
‘inadequate cooperation by a third State could hamper further development of 
relations with the EU’ (Peers, 2004:5). And although the conclusion of such 
agreements is not new, the fact that they now fall within the competence of the 
Union has turned the practice into a Community tool and made it more 
widespread.  
3.7 Conclusion 
This chapter started off by questioning in what way the nature of the 
Europeanization of asylum and immigration policy since the ToA and the steps 
towards a common immigration and asylum system taken affect the right to 
seek refugee status. In conformity with the hypothesis, it has been illustrated 
that there has indeed increasingly been a restrictive interpretation and 
externalization of the obligations under the Geneva Convention, threatening 
the right to seek refugee status and violating the principle of non-refoulement.  
First of all, Europeanization, as the process of building EU-level 
institutions has led to ‘dirty’ communitarization, where unanimity voting and 
the lack of public scrutiny or judicial control in general has led to the adoption 
of standards at the lowest common denominator. It has been argued however 
that in case QMV would have prevailed, in the absence of adequate scrutiny-
mechanisms, the process of Europeanization might also have led to the 
adoption of more stringent asylum policies, in line with the preferences of 
bigger Member States. 
 In terms of Europeanization as the impact on the domestic level of 
Member States this lowest common denominator has allowed traditionally 
more liberal states, like Germany, to lower their standards too. Furthermore, 
through prescriptive Europeanization the New Member States were forced to 
adopt the full acquis and hence the stage was set for restrictive domestic asylum 
policies. On the other hand, through the Dublin Regulation heavy burdens 
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were placed on border states, who in the absence of a burden sharing 
mechanism started to ‘de-Europeanize’ their immigration policies by pursuing 
their own defensive policies. 
Moreover, in terms of actual policies conducted at the EU level, visa 
requirements and the harmonization of carrier sanctions have impeded access 
to the whole of the EU. Carrier sanctions in addition also constitute a risk of 
refoulement when carriers are forced to transport back asylum seekers to prevent 
getting fined. 
Lastly, there has been an increasing externalization of EU-responsibility 
over asylum seekers to third countries, amongst others through the Union wide 
acceptance of the safe-third-country principle and the conclusion of 
readmission agreements, which now fall within the competence of the Union. 
Not only does this practice place a heavy burden on countries that are less well 
resourced, but it also risks a violation of the principle of non-refoulement in the 
absence of refugee-safeguards.  
Of course, in actual numbers it is impossible to assess how many refugees 
have not been able to leave their country, have been readmitted to unsafe 
places, or fell victim to chain-refoulement as a result of EU-policies. What is 
assessable is the ‘sharp downward trend in the number of new asylum-seekers 
arriving on the continent. Between 2002 and 2005, the number of new asylum 
claims submitted in Europe almost halved’. According to the UNHCR ‘it is 
generally believed that more restrictive asylum policies in many parts of 
Europe’ have hugely contributed to this decrease (UNHCR, 2007a:46). This 
chapter has illustrated that ‘more restrictive asylum policies’ have been 
facilitated and aggravated by the process of Europeanization. The next chapter 
will explain, through theories of European integration, why this 
Europeanization process has been characterized by dirty-communitarization 
and externalization. 
4 THEORIZING EUROPEANIZATION AND THE RIGHT TO 
SEEK REFUGEE STATUS 
In the previous chapter it has been argued that the shift of asylum and 
immigration policies to the EU-level has led to deterioration of the right to 
seek refugee status. Firstly, through a process of ‘dirty communitarization’, 
unanimity voting led to policy-making at the lowest common denominator, 
which on the one hand allowed more liberal states to adjust their asylum 
systems downwards, and on the other hand made New Member States adjust 
their premature asylum-systems to the restrictive parameters of the rest of the 
Union. Secondly, the Europeanization of asylum issues has led to 
externalization of the responsibility for refugees, by making it practically 
impossible to reach European soil ‘normally’, because of strict travel document 
requirements and carrier sanctions. Furthermore, ‘arrived’ asylum seekers run 
the risk of refoulement, through the adoption of safe-third-country rule and the 
conclusion of readmission agreements. Lastly, the implementation of a 
mechanism for determining Member State’s responsibility of refugees in the 
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absence of a burden sharing mechanism, has led some border states to pursue 
their own even more restrictive practices. This chapter will try to do explain 
how this particular nature of the Europeanization of immigration and asylum 
policies can be explained through theories of European integration.  
In order to do so, first the classical dichotomy in European integration 
theory will be set out, based on International Relations (IR) theory: 
neofunctionalism versus (liberal) intergovernmentalism. A short description of 
a third IR-approach, constructivism, will be delivered, before drawing a 
dichotomy on a parallel level between sociological and rational choice 
institutionalism. Subsequently these prevailing dichotomies will be regrouped 
in transformative or actor-based approaches and reproductive or structure-
based approaches. Afterwards both approaches will be applied to the case of 
the Europeanization of asylum and immigration policy.  
4.1 Theories of European Integration  
Although there seems to be a global consensus that the Union is ‘an 
extraordinary achievement in modern world politics’ (Moravcsik, 1998:1), there 
is less consensus when it comes to the nature of the Union and the causes of 
its development. As tools for explaining the process of Europeanization, 
longer-established meta-theoretical frames, such as neofunctionalism, new 
institutionalism, constructivism or liberal intergovernmentalism can be 
employed (Featherstone, 2003:12). Due to space constraints, only major 
assumptions of these overarching meta-theoretical frames will be presented. It 
should however be realized that a huge variety of approaches exists within 
these ‘frames’. Furthermore, theories of European integration are not 
necessarily incompatible and neither do any of them explain the entire EU. 
Hence it might be preferable ‘to see integration theory as a mosaic in which 
different perspectives come together in their own right’ (Wiener and Diez, 
2004:242).  
4.1.1 Neofunctionalism versus (liberal) intergovernmentalism 
The classical dichotomy in European integration theory finds its origin in IR 
theory. The first attempts to theoretically conceptualize the nature of the 
European integration process date back to the 1950’s, when Ernst Haas 
published the Uniting of Europe (1958). Neofunctionalists attempt to explain why 
states are voluntarily pooling their sovereignty in supranational institutions by 
adopting a pluralist view of international politics. As a reaction against the then 
prevailing realist school, neofunctionalists assume that the state is neither a 
unified actor, nor the only player on the international stage. On the one hand 
government policies are determined by pressures from various interests 
groups. On the other hand supranational institutions, in this case the 
Commission can play a pivotal role in pushing for further integration (George 
and Bach, 2001:9). Pressures for deeper integration build up through 
functional, as well as political spillover effects. Functional spillover happens 
‘when an original goal can be assured only by taking further integrative action’ 
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(Post and Niemann, 2007:7). Political spillover denotes a convergence and shift 
of loyalties and identities to the European level by elites, who will ‘adjust their 
aspirations by turning to supranational means when this course appears 
profitable’ (Haas, 1966 in: George and Bach, 2001:12).  
In the 60’s, a counter-argument, drawing on the prevailing state-centered 
IR-perspective realism, was developed. Stanley Hoffman (1964; 1966), the 
protagonist of the early intergovernmental perspective, although not denying 
some influence of actors outside the governments, maintained that national 
governments are and would always be the ‘ultimate arbiters of key decisions’ 
(George and Bach, 2001:13). From the intergovernmental perspective the 
nature and pace of the integration process are determined by national interests 
and the power of bigger member states. Decisions to cooperate at the 
European level should be regarded in relation to the position of the state in a 
wider world system, by which its autonomy is being constrained. The argument 
is that in the anarchical surrounding of the state system, governments are 
strengthened, rather than weakened, as a result of the intergovernmental 
cooperation (George and Bach, 2001:12). This intergovernmentalist model 
could however not convincingly explain why states were handing over 
sovereignty to supranational bodies, especially after 1985 when the European 
project was reactivated leading to the single European market.  
After twenty ‘doldrums years’ for both the European integration process 
and its scholarship, Andrew Moravcsik crafted a more rigorous version of 
intergovernmentalism that could elucidate this supranational institution 
building from a state-centered perspective: liberal intergovernmentalism. Like 
realism and ‘traditional’ intergovernmentalism, this approach started from the 
premise that states are rational and the principal actors in the international 
arena and that their actions are constrained by their position in the 
interdependent structure of the international system. But in contrast Moravcsik 
did not treat states as black-boxes, but rather like neofunctionalists, started 
from a liberal conceptualization of the state.  
EU integration can best be understood as a series of rational choices made by 
national leaders. The choices responded to constraints and opportunities 
stemming from the economic interests of powerful domestic constituents, the 
relative power of each state in the international system, and the role of 
institutions in bolstering the credibility of interstate commitments (1998:18). 
From this quote Moravcsik ‘three-step-model’ of European integration 
can be derived. In the first step he adheres to a ‘liberal theory of national 
preference formation’, where pressures stemming from the economic interests 
of domestic groups determine the position of the national government in 
international negotiations (1993:81). Within these international negotiations, 
domestic actors do not play a significant independent role (Schimmelfennig, 
2004:77). Rather, outcomes in the second step are determined by the relative 
bargaining power of member states. The third step is to agree on a suitable 
institutional set-up to ensure the compliance of all member states to the 
outcomes of the negotiations. Hence (powerful) member states might push for 
supranational institutions, in which sovereignty is pooled, to prevent defecting. 
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But the supranational institutions are themselves thought to have little 
influence over policy outcomes. Thus historic intergovernmental agreements 
are perceived to have been driven by: 
a gradual process of preference convergence among the most powerful member 
states, which then struck central bargains among themselves, offered side-
payments to smaller member states and delegated strictly limited powers to 
supranational organizations that remained more or less obedient servants of the 
member states (Pollack, 2005:18). 
4.1.2 Social constructivism 
Social constructivism arrived at EU-studies quite late (end of the 90’s), but as 
an IR-approach has been around for a while. Social constructivism in contrast 
with the neofunctional and (liberal) intergovernmental approaches, rejects the 
notion of rationalism, but instead maintains that:  
human agents do not exist independent from their social environment and its 
collectively shared systems of meanings […]. The social environment in which 
we find ourselves, defines (‘constitutes’) who we are, our identities as social 
beings’ (Risse, 2004:160/161). 
In relation to IR, this means that ideational factors and identity should be 
accorded just as significant a causal role as pure material interests (Hay, 
2002:20/21). However as such ‘social constructivism does not make any 
substantive claims about European integration’ and can easily join a variety of 
approaches (Risse, 2004:160), for example the institutionalist school to be 
discussed below.  
4.1.3 Sociological versus rational choice institutionalism 
On a parallel level with the dichotomy in IR-theory, but this time derived from 
comparative politics, ‘the 1990’s witnessed the emergence of a new dichotomy 
in EU studies, pitting rationalist scholars against [social] constructivists’ 
(Pollack, 2005:25). This dichotomy also became embedded in the new 
institutionalism schools that in general maintains that the institutional setting 
itself had been neglected by the classical integration theories. On one side of 
the spectrum, sociological institutionalists question the rationalist assumptions 
and argue that EU institutions have an effect on ‘social identities and 
fundamental interests of actors’ (Risse, 2004:160/161). Hence their ontological 
starting point is social constructivist. Deeper European integration from a 
sociological institutionalist point of view can thus be explained by the 
constitutive and transformative character of EU institutions, in which member 
states act on the basis of the ‘logic of appropriateness’. 
On the other side of the spectrum, rationalist approaches, like liberal 
intergovernmentalism, start from the ‘logic of consequentialism’, where actors 
are perceived to act as utility maximizers whose preferences and identities are a 
given. Rational choice institutionalists added to this that ‘social institutions 
including the EU primarily constrain [...] the behaviour of actors’, but can also 
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act as opportunity structures (Risse, 2004:163). For example, decision making 
rules shape policy outcomes in predictable ways. An example of this is 
unanimity voting, leading to the adoption of the lowest common denominator.  
One approach within rational choice institutionalism deemed particularly 
relevant for the study of the Europeanization of asylum and immigration is the 
concept of two-level bargaining. ‘The insight of the "two-level" metaphor is that 
governments, acting in the domestic and international arena’s simultaneously, 
have to conciliate domestic demands with international pressures’ (Post and 
Niemann, 2007:6). On the one hand, when negotiating on the international 
level, governments may (ab)use domestic constraints as bargaining power. On 
the other hand, governments may seek to be bound by international 
agreements to impose domestic reforms (Featherstone, 2003:9). As will be 
illustrated, the two-level ‘game’ has been played two-ways by Germany at the 
detriment of refugee protection. 
A drawback of institutionalist theories is that no explanation is provided 
for the root causes of European integration. Therefore it might be fruitful to 
link them up with traditional IR theories in order to explain the process of 
integration at large. 
4.1.4 Regrouping: transformative versus reproductive approaches 
Indeed some aspects of the meta-theoretical approaches are not necessarily 
incompatible, but just explain different parts of the ‘beast’. In an attempt to 
map the various European integration approaches, Philippe Schmitter drafted 
the Figure 4.1.5 
As becomes clear from the shaded areas, there are two defining 
dimensions that pit neofunctionalism together with sociological 
institutionalism against (liberal) intergovernmentalism coupled with rational 
institutionalism, the former groups being characterized as ‘constructivist’ and 
‘transformative’, whereas the latter is described as ‘rationalist’ and 
‘reproductive’.  
To start with the transformative group, both neofunctionalism and 
sociological institutionalism presume that ‘both actors and the "games they 
play" will change significantly in the course of the integration process’ 
(Schmitter, 2004:47). The starting point of neofunctionalism is rather different 
from the assumptions of constructivism, because neofunctionalist accounts 
start from the rationalist assumption of utility-maximizing elites as the initial 
drive for integration. However, once integration has been set into motion, 
political spillover leads to convergence of identities to the supranational level 
by implying ‘some constitutive effect of European integration on the various 
societal and political actors’ (Risse, 2004:162). Thus, both neofunctionalism  
                                                 
5  The graph has considerably been simplified. For a full depiction and a thorough 
explanation see: Schmitter (2004). 
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FIGURE 4.1 
 Theories of regional integration 
 
Source: Schmitter 2004, p.48 
 
and sociological institutionalism, although coming from a different starting 
position, revolve around the transformation and construction of European 
norms, beliefs and identities. Alternatively, they could also be branded actor-
based approaches, as the driving force for integration are the identities of the 
actors involved. However, a critique that could be voiced is that these actor-
based approaches offer no explanation as to which or whose interests are 
involved in shaping and modifying this identity; they lack power perspective. 
In contrast stand liberal intergovernmentalism and rational choice 
institutionalism that start from the premise that integration ‘reproduces the 
existing characteristics of its member-state participants and the interstate 
system of which they are part’ (Schmitter, 2004:47). In these approaches 
sovereign states will remain the central actors, whose preferences will 
determine the pace and outcome of the integration process. However, not 
every member state is in an equal position to determine this pace and outcome. 
Existing power-inequalities in the state system mean that the integration 
process will predominantly be determined by the interests of bigger, more 
powerful member states. From a rational institutional perspective, these 
existing power disparities between Member States also tend to be reproduced 
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in the institutions created at the European level, for example apparent in the 
relative weight that is given to each vote in the Council (roughly weighted on 
the basis of population). In contrast with the actor-based approaches, this 
reproductive perspective is derived from a ‘structuralist’ point of view, in ‘that 
it takes as its object of investigation a ‘system’, that is, the reciprocal relations 
among parts of a whole, rather than the study of the different parts in isolation’ 
(Palma, 1989 in Cypher and Dietsz, 1997:171). Hence the relationship of 
Member States vis-à-vis each other is determined by their position in the state-
system as a whole. But structuralist explanations need not be confined to the 
level of the state.  
This seems to be a lacuna in any of the approaches discussed; there is a 
lack of attention for power relations beyond the state level. As argued the 
transformative approaches seem to be completely void of power relations. In 
the reproductive approaches, power and interests do play a vital role in shaping 
the integration process. But power is conceptualized at the level of the state. 
Although Moravcsik accounts for state preferences being shaped by domestic 
economic power configurations, these configurations do not play a role when 
bargaining at the international level. None of these approaches gives attention 
to other possible constituencies of the ‘system’, such as companies or classes 
that could be shaping the integration process (Smith, 2001:246). An analysis of 
power structures beyond the level of the state, will unfortunately also fall 
outside the scope of this paper, but would be an interesting field for further 
inquiry.  
4.2 Theories of European Integration and the Right to Seek 
Refugee Status 
The question that lingers is how these theories can explain why the outcome of 
the integration process in terms of asylum and immigration has been partial, 
cross-pillar and overall detrimental for refugee protection. Hence this second 
part will, after analyzing the exogenous factors and functional spillovers 
guiding the Europeanization of immigration and asylum policy, successively 
apply a transformative and a reproductive approach. 
4.2.1 Exogenous pressures 
The EU does not develop in a vacuum and thus exogenous pressures, 
originating outside of the integration process, might play a pivotal role in the 
drive for integration. For neofunctionalists in an ‘increasingly global world, 
states seek international solutions to domestic problems’ (Faist and Ette, 
2007:7/8).  Due to exogenous spillover effects, states decide to transfer 
sovereignty to a higher supranational level, because issues go beyond their 
national ability to solve. Liberal intergovernmentalism on the other hand would 
argue that exogenous pressure leads ‘to the convergence of national 
preferences and therefore establish a precondition for cooperation’ (Faist and 
Ette, 2007:8). 
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In the case of the immigration and asylum policies, there was a manifold 
of exogenous pressures that led to ‘Europeanization’. Firstly, due to the end of 
the Cold War, globalization and the unification of Germany, there was a huge 
upsurge in the number of asylum seekers crossing European borders during 
the nineties. This upsurge was combined with rising levels of unemployment 
throughout Western Europe, leading to civil unrest and rising levels of 
xenophobia and consequently a rise of right-wing governments, who started to 
introduce more restrictive national legislation. Due to the interdependent 
nature of the refugee protection regime and arguably due to a functional 
spillover effect of the Schengen agreements, more liberal governments felt the 
need to follow suit. Furthermore, advancing globalization also resulted in 
increased cross-border crime and terrorism. Hence ‘measures towards 
harmonizing the treatment of asylum seekers arriving in the EU have become 
confused with issues of security’ (Amnesty, 2004:1). The 9/11 terrorist attacks 
only intensified this securitization of immigration and asylum issues. 
4.2.2 Functional spillovers 
Within the neofunctional approach to European integration functional 
spillovers are an important drive for deeper European integration. In this case 
the most important functional pressure was the abolition of internal border 
controls, which meant that once an asylum seeker crossed any EU-border he 
could practically apply for asylum in any or even a multitude of Member States. 
In order to contain this increased risk of ‘asylum shopping’, mechanisms to 
assign the responsible Member State were put in place, but these in turn 
created their own functional pressures to harmonize asylum systems (Post and 
Niemann, 2007:7). An additional functional pressure was the looming 
enlargement, expanding the borders of the EU to ‘porous’ frontiers eastwards, 
hence it became essential the Eastern states would be ‘secured’ from heaps of 
immigrants flowing in.  
A strong argument can be made that the drive for cooperation on the EU 
level in the field of asylum and immigration was at least partly the result of 
functional spillover pressures of the desire to bring down borders. However, 
these pressures in themselves cannot explain why the communitarization took 
the shape it did (partial and cross-pillar). In addition, functional pressures can 
also be used in a liberal intergovernmentalist argument where these pressures 
build up to national preference convergence. 
4.2.3 Transformative approaches and the Europeanization of 
asylum 
Therefore, in order to explain the character of communitarization from a 
transformative perspective, we should be looking into the role of the 
Commission, political spillover effects and the role of interest groups. To start 
with the latter, because migration and asylum tend to be framed as a security 
rather than economic issues, this excludes the usual suspects of economic 
interest groups and multi-national corporations, to have played an important 
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role. In general, ‘immigration politics […] are usually regarded as elite-
dominated and characterized as a policy sector with strong executive 
dominance and only minor access by the legislatures, political parties and 
interest groups’ (Faist and Ette, 2007:24). It is however highly unlikely that 
elite-convergence of loyalties towards EU-level, through political spillover, had 
taken place before the communitarization. This is because the national 
ministries of the interior prevailing in the field of immigration had thus far 
hardly been involved in the European integration process (Lavenex, 2001:867). 
In addition there is ‘sparse evidence for socialization of national officials into 
European preferences or identities’ at all (Pollack, 2005:25). 
Furthermore, the role of the Commission as a ‘stimulator of political 
spillover’ has also been contested. Concerning the communitarization of 
asylum policies, if it had indeed been the Commission that called the tune for 
further integration, why then was a transitional period of five years included 
and why were some states allowed to opt-out? Also, decision making during 
those transitional years have been characterized as cumbersome negotiations in 
the Council, with ‘the tendency of the Council to water down the most liberal 
proposals’ coming from the Commission (Antoniou, 2003). And if there 
indeed had been a transformation of the loyalties of the political elites, why 
then were member states so reluctant to hand over sovereignty and created 
such a hybrid and cross-pillar system? Hence it seems that a transformed 
identity does not come in as a helpful explanatory tool for the ‘turn to Europe.’ 
Consequently, we turn to the reproductive approaches. 
4.2.4 Reproductive approaches and the Europeanization of asylum 
It is hardly deniable that functional pressures have been a prime incentive for 
European cooperation in immigration and asylum issues, but neither can it be 
denied that Member States were reluctant to give up sovereignty exemplified 
by the incorporation of unanimity voting in the first pillar. In addition, the shift 
to QMV was made conditional upon prior unanimous adoption of minimum 
standards. Also many asylum issues were only dealt with in the second pillar. 
Lastly, the fact that three member states were allowed to opt-out all together 
seems to hint at the persistence of the primacy of Member State in congruence 
with the reproductive approaches.  
As already argued, immigration was framed as a security issue, therefore 
the liberal assumption, that national preferences reflect the balance of 
economic interests at first sight, does not seem to hold true. It rather seems 
more likely that national preferences in this case were largely shaped by the 
exogenous pressures described above, chiefly the large influx of asylum 
seekers, in addition to the functional spillover of the abolition of internal 
borders. These exogenous and functional spillovers, could be argued to have 
shaped electoral preference for more stringent asylum policies. This on its turn 
led to a convergence of national preferences of several Member States, which 
set the stage for further cooperation in the field of immigration. 
However, the conclusion that national preferences in the case of 
immigration are not determined by national economic interests might be 
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premature. It could be argued that, in an industrial type of economy, economic 
elites might push for liberal migration policies, as this will guarantee the supply 
of cheap labour. However, in the de-industrialized phase of most European 
economies, this demand for cheap labour is largely replaced by high skilled 
labour and the influx of immigrants would only threaten the welfare systems of 
these economies. To what extent economic interests might have played a role 
in shaping the process of Europeanization would be an interesting field for 
further research beyond the scope of this paper. 
It should be realized that not all Member States were affected equally by 
the exogenous pressures described, since some countries take a much larger 
share of asylum seekers. Moravcsik and Nicolaïdis analyzed that ‘Germany is 
the government most vulnerable for external interdependence, since it takes a 
disproportionate share of EU immigrants and was [thus] the most adamant 
promoter of greater EU involvement’ (1999:63). Germany also shares the 
largest border with the New Member states, making it particularly vulnerable 
for asylum seekers coming from the East; hence it was important for Germany 
that functioning, restrictive asylum policies were put into place before the New 
Member States would accede and that accession was made conditional upon 
the adoption of these policies. Germany in particular sought to have the EU 
endorse its bilateral agreements with countries of eastern and central Europe 
on policies of returning immigrants to transit countries (Moravcsik and 
Nicolaïdis, 1999:63). Indeed, through the ToA, the EU was granted the 
competence to conclude readmission agreements alongside the Member States. 
On the other hand, countries like Britain and Ireland, which being islands 
naturally have stronger control over their own borders, opposed supranational 
involvement. Britain threatened to use a veto, but eventually was allowed to 
opt out, together with Ireland and Denmark. The third Member State with 
quite some bargaining power was France, which was hesitant to put more 
power into the hands of the Commission and would only go along with the 
communitarization if a transitional period would be installed (Moravcsik and 
Nicolaïdis, 1999:78-79). Hence it seems that indeed the outcomes of 
negotiation in Amsterdam were a reflection of the relative bargaining power of 
Member States, where Germany set the stage, France determined the pace and 
UK left the table: 
The primary lessons of Amsterdam for bargaining theory is that no amount of 
institutional facilitation or political entrepreneurship, supranational or otherwise, 
can overcome underlying divergence or ambivalence in national interests’ 
(Moravcsik and Nicolaïdis, 1999:83). 
Then how can we explain the choice for supranationalism by the rest of 
the Member States after the transitional period? A rational choice theory of 
institutional choice maintains that states pool sovereignty through QMV, to 
enhance credibility of their agreement. In this case this in particular made sense 
in light of the enlargement. Restrictive immigration and asylum policies and 
thus tight border controls would not be desirable for the New Member States, 
as they ‘could notably endanger local economies’ (Hélène, 2007:4). On the one 
hand, states were reluctant to give up sovereignty in the field of asylum; on the 
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other hand they needed to be sure that especially the new Member States 
would not defect. Therefore the five year-transitional period allowed them to 
agree on minimum standards by unanimity that the New Member States would 
have to comply with. There is also another institutional logic to this, derived 
from historical institutionalism being that institutions and ‘its’ decisions are 
‘sticky’. So once those minimal standards would be agreed upon, QMV 
constitutes a high hurdle to overturn past choices (Pollack, 2005:20-21).  
Lastly the institutional structure of the Amsterdam Treaty, notable the 
unanimity rule, permitted the Member States to play two-level games, and 
hence to uphold specific domestic procedures. Post and Niemann analyzed 
that Germany, during the negotiation of the Procedure Directive, discussed in 
Chapter 2, was able to export its "super-safe-third-country" concept to the 
European level. Germany, facilitated by unanimity voting, was pointing at 
domestic constraints to strengthen their bargaining position at the EU-level. 
Particularly forceful was the argument that Germany wanted to prevent 
constitutional change, as the safe-third-country-principle was embedded in 
their 1993 Constitution. Interestingly during the change of the Constitution 
itself, the German government ‘played the game’ the other way around ‘as 
conservative policy-makers skilfully argued that ratification and functioning of 
European initiatives would require’ a change of the Constitution (Post and 
Niemann, 2007:32). Hence it could be argued that the position of the 
government of Germany was strengthened, instead of weakened through EU 
cooperation, as it was able to manipulate domestic and international 
constraints to push through its own preferences.  
4.3 Conclusion 
This chapter started with the question how the nature of Europeanization, 
which led to the deterioration of refugee rights, can be explained through 
theories of European Integration. First it has been established that IR theories 
of and comparative approaches to European integration can be grouped into 
transformative and reproductive approaches. The former, including 
neofunctionalism and sociological institutionalism, start from a social-
constructivist ontology and revolve around the construction and 
transformation of identity, norms and loyalties of actors and provide for a role 
of supranational institutions to enhance this identity. However, this perspective 
has been criticized for being void of power relations. The latter, including 
liberal intergovernmentalism and rational choice institutionalism, start from a 
structuralist perspective, focusing on the reproduction of power structures at 
the European level and giving primacy to (powerful) sovereign Member States. 
Although this approach does include a power perspective, it does not go 
beyond the level of the state, which would be an interesting field for further 
studies.  
It has been analyzed that a reproductive approach provides the best 
explanation for the Europeanization of asylum and immigration policies. 
Given that states have been reluctant to hand over sovereignty - exemplified by 
the partial character of the communitarization with its opt-out’s and the 
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adoption of minimum standards, lacking a full-fledged harmonization and a 
burden-sharing mechanism, and the cross-pillar approach - it seems highly 
unlikely that there has indeed been a transformation or socialization of elite 
identity towards deeper integration. In addition the Commission has only 
played a marginal role, as the proposals it has been putting forward have been 
watered down consistently by the Council.  
Furthermore neofunctionalism, in terms of functional (though not 
political) spillover, does seem to have a huge explanatory value. One of the 
major drives for cooperation namely has been the abolition of internal border 
controls. In addition exogenous pressures such as the increase in asylum 
seekers and cross-border crime, due to the end of the Cold War, globalization, 
the unification of Germany and 9/11, created the need for a common policy. 
These neofunctionalist spillovers and exogenous pressures have been argued to 
have led to national preference convergence compatible with liberal 
intergovernmentalism. 
In sum, it seem that in line with a reproductive approach, Member States 
have remained the principal actors at the expense of supranational institutions, 
chiefly the Commission, and that existing power structures have reproduced 
itself on the European level, by largely adopting the German agenda as the 
European agenda. However, the bargaining process might be expected to have 
flowed ‘smoothly and without significant domestic political conflict because 
the restrictive European asylum measures have been supported by most 
national governments’ (Faist and Ette, 2007:17). 
This is a rather unfortunate conclusion. ‘By privileging the sovereignty of 
the Member States vis-à-vis both European integration and refugee protection, 
the securitarian policy frame has impeded a substantive harmonization of 
national asylum policies’ (Lavenex, 2001:855). Would the Commission have 
been the driving force for the communitarization of asylum and immigration 
issues, the policies adopted would probably have been more ‘refugee-friendly’ 
as has been illustrated by the persistent tendency of the Council to water down 
liberal proposal made by the Commission (Antoniou, 2003).  
5 FRONTEX AND THE RIGHT TO SEEK REFUGEE STATUS6 
So far a general overview has been provided of the Europeanization of asylum 
and immigration policies. It has been argued that the shift of asylum and 
immigration policies to the EU-level has been partial and detrimental to the 
protection of refugees. Amongst other things this is because EU-Member 
States have been harmonizing their respective asylum systems downwards and 
policies have been adopted that make it practically impossible to reach 
European borders legally. In addition there has been an externalization of 
                                                 
6 For this chapter Frontex has repeatedly been approached, but has not been available 
for commentary. 
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responsibility for refugees, by making it possible to send potential asylum 
seekers back to third countries or countries of origin which are deemed safe, 
but which sometimes are dangerous, thus risking refoulement.  
From a theoretical point of view, it has been argued that this harmful 
nature of the partial-Europeanization process can be traced back on the one 
hand to functional spill-over effects, chiefly the abolition of internal borders. 
On the other hand intergovernmentalism has persisted in this policy area, 
where Member States have been careful only to transfer a minimal amount of 
sovereignty, and have tried to deal with migration issues in the 
intergovernmental second pillar as much as possible. Also, powerful member 
states have been able to push through their preferences, like the push by 
Germany to grant the EU competence to conclude readmission agreements. 
Left aside so far is that the abolition of internal borders, has also led to an 
increase in the control of external borders. In order to coordinate the 
operational cooperation between Member States on border security, since 2005 
an EU-community body has been called into being:  Frontex. This chapter will 
analyze whether Frontex, as an illustrative case-study, suffers from the same 
characteristics of the wider Europeanization, like the reluctance to hand over 
sovereignty, and the externalization of the ‘refugee problem’, under the guiding 
question: how does Frontex and in particular its operations affect the right to 
seek refugee status? 
Firstly the mandate and tasks of Frontex will be discussed in relation to 
the obligation to protect refugees. Subsequently special attention will be given 
to the longest running joint operation at sea, operation Hera around the 
Canary Islands, to illustrate the possible consequences of interception 
operations at sea for the right to seek refugee status. 
5.1 Frontex’ Tasks and the Right to Seek Refugee Status 
The name Frontex is derived from the French Frontières extérieures. The agency 
was legally established under Council Regulation (EC) 2007/2004, for which 
the legal basis can be found under Title IV of the ToA (art.62.2.a/66). Hence 
Frontex should be regarded as part of the process of communitarization of 
asylum and immigration policies (Carrera, 2007:17).  
According to its own website, Frontex raison d’être is ‘to integrate national 
border security systems of Member States against all kind of threats that could 
happen at or through the external border of the Member States.’ Like the shift 
of immigration and asylum to the first pillar, the creation of Frontex should 
also be seen as a result of exogenous and functional spillover pressures. The 
former, essentially, increased cross-border crime and terrorism resulted in the 
framing of immigration and border management as security concerns. 
Functionally speaking, the abolishment of internal borders led to the increased 
importance of collective protection of external borders. 
The border-agency supposedly is intelligence-based, independent and 
depoliticized. Its primary task is to coordinate and assist in operational 
cooperation between Member States in the management of external borders. 
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In addition, Frontex also carries out risk analysis and research, and is assigned 
the task to establish common training standards for national border guards. 
Lastly, the agency is also deemed to provide support for joint return 
operations.  
Frontex’ operations will usually take place at the request of one or several 
Member States, and need the agreement of all states involved. Mr Laitinen, 
Frontex’ director, recently made clear that: ‘Frontex doesn’t have any vessels 
itself […]. These assets belong to the Member States and they are subject to 
their will to deploy them’ (2007). It is repeatedly stated, in the Regulation, at 
the Frontex-website and in its public communication that responsibility for the 
control of the external borders lies with the Member States, not with Frontex. 
This demonstrates the politicized nature of the organization, as it capacity to 
act ‘is overly dependent on the actual level of cooperation from the Member 
States’ (Carrera, 2007:9), which in conformity with previous chapters points at 
the reluctance of Member States to hand over sovereignty. 
In addition, there is a severe lack of democratic control over the agency’s 
activities. Although Frontex is a ‘first-pillar-organization’ and thus its budget 
has to be approved by the EP, in all other matters the Parliament is left out. 
The basis for all joint operations are risk assessments. These describe ‘among 
other issues, the roots, routes, modus operandi, patterns of irregular 
movements, conditions of the countries of transit, statistics of irregular flows 
and displacement’ (Carrera, 2007:14). Yet the substance of those assessments 
are kept secret for the public. 
In addition to the persistence of intergovernmentalism, and the lack of 
public scrutiny, there is another parallel to the overall character of 
communitarization of immigration. Despite Frontex’ first-pillar nature, it 
fulfills many tasks belonging to the second pillar (ILPA, 2007). The majority of 
the joint operations are enacted outside the territory of the EU. Frontex also 
takes part in joint-return-operations, assisting with the transfer of supposed 
‘illegal’ immigrants back to their country of origin or a transit country. For 
these operations, Community financial means might be used. This joint-return-
competence ´is the most widely discussed assignment of the Agency, especially 
as regards human rights, the increasing number of expulsions and the lack of 
common EU policy in immigration and asylum’ (Hélène, 2007:17-18). 
Particularly the lack of a fully harmonized asylum system makes it problematic 
that Frontex assists in returning potential asylum seekers, without verifying 
whether someone has actually been put through a fair process.  
But this criticism on the lack of attention for the protection of refugees 
can be applied to the entire organization. It is highly remarkable for an 
organization which deals with border management and thus inevitably with 
asylum seekers, that absolutely nowhere, not in its Regulation, nor on the 
Frontex website, nor in the evaluation of the joint operations, any reference is 
made to asylum seekers, refugees or Member States’ obligations under the 
Geneva Convention. Only recently, Frontex has invited UNHCR to establish 
an institutional form of cooperation. UNHCR has urged Frontex to ‘include 
training on international human rights and refugee law in the revised Common 
Core Curriculum for border guards’ (UNHCR, 2007b:48).  
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Only very recently, in July 2007, the original Frontex-Regulation was 
amended by the adoption of the RABIT-Regulation ((EC)853/2007). This 
Regulation establishes Rapid Border Intervention Teams (RABIT) to provide 
operational assistance to a Member States, in urgent cases, such as the arrival 
of large numbers of third-country nationals (art.1). Leaving aside the potential 
implications of such RABIT-teams, what is important is that the Regulation 
includes that it ‘shall apply without prejudice to the rights of refugees and 
persons requesting international protection’ (art.2). The RABIT Regulation was 
one of the first pieces of co-decision legislation to be adopted under Title IV. 
Hence the EP was able to exert influence and incorporate the protection of 
refugees into the Regulation. But in recent statements both the European 
Council on Refugees and Exiles (ECRE) and the Immigration Law 
Practitioners’ Association (ILPA) have criticized Frontex for not making clear 
anywhere how it will make the protection of refugees operational. And as 
Frontex hardly makes any information publicly available, it is difficult to check 
whether safeguards for refugees are really in place (2007). 
5.2 Frontex’ Joint Operation at Sea and the Right to Seek 
Refugee Status 
Frontex tasks are not limited to operations at sea, but include any area of 
border protection including airports and land-borders. Operations at sea have 
however been Frontex’ main occupation in its short history of existence. 
Examples are Operation Poseidon, focusing on the Eastern Mediterranean 
region, where vessels amongst other things have been diverted to Turkey, and 
Operation Nautilus, centering on the Central Mediterranean to tackle the 
migration flows to Malta and Italy. The longest running joint operation has 
been Operation Hera, on the Atlantic, near the Canary Islands (belonging to 
Spain). This operation will be taken as an example to explain the drawbacks of 
joint interception operations for refugee protection.  
Operation Hera was started on the request of Spain, in response to 
migration flows departing from the coast of West Africa and heading for the 
Canary Islands. The fist stage of the operation (July-October 2006) consisted 
of a group of experts from various EU countries giving support to the Spanish 
National Police with the identification of irregular immigrants who arrived to 
the Canary Islands without papers (Carrera, 2007:20). The main purpose was to 
identify countries of origin to make return easier and to catch the facilitators of 
the immigration flow. The second stage (Hera II: August-December 2006) 
brought together ‘technical border surveillance equipment from several 
Member States with the aim to enhance the control of the area between the 
West African coast and the Canary Islands, thus diverting the vessels using this 
migration route’ (Frontex website). The actual purpose of the operation was to 
discourage immigrants from setting off from the African West-Coast in the 
first place. In case vessels would go to sea anyway, the joint forces of Frontex 
would attempt to intercept the boats in the territorial waters of in this case 
Mauritania and Senegal and transport the intercepted boats back to African 
shores. Only if vessels had already passed the 24-mile zone and found 
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themselves in international waters, were they guided to the Canary Islands and 
granted the possibility to make an asylum claim (Carrera, 2007:21). The latter 
case means that at least in first instance the principle of ‘non-return’ was 
upheld. However this does not hold true for the principle of non-rejection, 
seeing that potential asylum seekers are denied entry or at least have been 
denied to leave without any proper hearing. 
In addition, some reports severely doubt whether vessels already in 
international waters have indeed not been intercepted and returned, which 
would mean the principle on non-refoulement might have been violated. For 
example a UNHCR official commented that: ‘Difficult situations may arise out 
on the high seas and it is difficult to tell what is going on in interception 
operations’ (in: Crosbie, 2007, see also Kopp, 2007). 
In congruence with other Frontex material made available to the public, 
none of the information on operation Hera contains the notion of asylum 
seeker or refugee. ‘When the director of Frontex Mr Laitinen was asked about 
the fate of refugees who might also be targeted by these kinds of operations, 
he responded: "Refugees? They aren’t refugees, they’re illegal immigrants"‘ 
(Der Standard (21-12-2006) in: Kopp, 2007). 
Joint operations like these, taking place in territorial waters of third 
countries, can only be conducted with the consent of these third countries 
(Rijpma and Cremona, 2007:14). In case of the Frontex operations, it is 
required that the main countries involved, in this case only Spain, conclude a 
bilateral agreement with the countries in whose sea the surveillance operation 
will take place. According to Heijer the ‘African authorities […] are well paid 
for this "service" by Spain and the European Union’ (2007). However, the 
actual substance of these bilateral agreements remains closed to the public 
(Carrera, 2007), making these operations appear dubious at the least.  
In their public presentation the joint operations tend to be framed in a 
humanitarian discourse, such as: ‘joint operations at sea contribute to the 
reduction of human lives lost at sea during the dangerous long journey’ 
(Frontex website). Except that no proof exists for this fact, as ‘immigrants’ 
might try to find other, even more hazardous ways to make their way to the 
EU (Spijkerboer, 2007), questions can also be raised about the humanitarian 
discourse itself, by arguing that the EU ‘is erecting a ‘Berlin wall on water’ 
controlling its border while removed from public scrutiny’ (Rijpma and 
Cremona, 2007:20). What is ‘disregarded’ in this extra-territorial border control 
is that, in the attempt to prevent immigrants making their move to the EU, the 
mobility of potential asylum seekers is also being curbed, undermining the right 
to seek refugee status (ECRE, 2007:3). 
Besides that, throughout all Frontex documentation ‘illegal’ immigrants 
are treated as ‘numbers’, without any compassion for the complexity of their 
situation, and the only thing that is reported is how many have been 
intercepted, diverted or sent back, no information is released on the identity of 
those that have not been sent back. Asylum-seekers are simply non-existent in 
Frontex’ vocabulary. And: 
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Since it is not known whether any of the thousands of individuals that have come 
into contact with Frontex coordinated border guards wanted or attempted to 
seek asylum, we cannot be satisfied that adequate safeguards are in place to 
ensure that access to asylum is guaranteed (ECRE, 2007:8). 
5.3 Conclusion 
Based on the question how Frontex and its operations affect the right to seek 
refugee status, it has been illustrated that Frontex can serve as a mini-universe, 
suffering from the same characteristics as the wider harmful nature of 
Europeanization in the field of immigration and asylum. First of all, Frontex 
also came into existence as a result of exogenous and functional spillovers, 
chiefly the increase in cross-border crime and the abolishment of internal 
borders. Furthermore, Member States have been reluctant to hand over 
sovereignty in the field of border protection, which is why Frontex does not 
possess any operational power and is reliant on the consent of Member States. 
Frontex can thus be seen as an embodiment of EU’s Member States. There has 
also been a severe lack of public scrutiny as the European Parliament only has 
a say over the budget, while risk assessments and readmission agreements, on 
the basis of which operations are conducted, are kept secret.  
Most importantly, Frontex has been painstakingly silent on the mere 
existence of refugees, which is highly remarkable for an organization dealing 
with external borders. Furthermore, the joint interception operations at sea 
coordinated by Frontex should be seen as symptomatic for the externalization 
of the responsibility over refugees. It has been illustrated that Operation Hera, 
enacted in the territorial waters of Senegal and Mauritania, might or might not 
have violated the principle of non-refoulement, as Frontex claims that refugees 
that managed to cross territorial waters have been granted the possibility to 
lodge an asylum claim, but by some this is questioned. However, by 
intercepting third-country nationals without establishing their legal status in the 
territorial waters of third states, the mobility of refugees has been severely 
curbed (Carrera, 2007:25).  
One might argue, had Frontex not existed, ‘Member States would go it 
alone, under bilateral or other agreements with third countries’ (ILPA, 2007). 
The difference however, is that in such a case at least national governments 
would be more directly accountable to their Parliaments. Now there seems to 
be an accountability gap. In addition, because of Europeanization community 
budget was made available for interception operations on behalf of the whole 
Union. Thus again Europeanization led to the deterioration of refugee 
protection.  
To conclude, only last summer a new Regulation (the RABIT-Regulation) 
was adopted, for the first time through co-decision of the European 
Parliament, that positively specifies that Frontex’ operations should take into 
account refugee protection. However, Frontex has until today not made clear 
how this will be made operational. And all the while there is no way to 
scrutinize the actions carried out by Frontex on behalf of Member States, as 
almost all information is kept secret.  
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6 CONCLUSION 
At the beginning of this paper a picture was drafted of refugees being caught 
up in an undifferentiated movement of ‘illegal’ immigrants. For these refugees, 
a daunting challenge lay ahead to reach European shores safely in order to 
lodge a claim for asylum. The hypothetical question was posed whether this 
challenge would have been easier had the EU not existed. But the EU does 
exist and the ToA (1997) even ‘communitarized’ the policy areas of asylum and 
immigration. By looking at how the Europeanization of asylum and 
immigration policy affects the right to seek refugee status in the European 
Union in congruence with International Refugee Law, this paper has illustrated 
that this ‘existence of the EU’ has been leading to deterioration of the 
protection of refugees.  
Europeanization itself has been conceptualized as the responses to and 
effects of policies of the EU. First of all, it has been argued that the 
Europeanization, as building EU-level institutions, has led to partial and ‘dirty’ 
communitarization where unanimity voting and the lack of public scrutiny or 
judicial control has led to the adoption of standards at the lowest common 
denominator and allowed Member States to harmonize their respective asylum 
systems downwards, whereas other Member State have opted out of this policy 
field altogether. However, arguably a shift to QMV without putting into place 
adequate scrutiny mechanisms might have had the same effect, as restrictive 
policies in line with the preferences of bigger Member States would have 
prevailed. Moreover, prescriptive Europeanization made New Member States 
adjust their premature asylum-systems to the restrictive parameters of the rest 
of the Union. Lastly the implementation of a mechanism for determining 
Member State’s responsibility for asylum seekers (the Dublin II Regulation), in 
the absence of a burden sharing mechanism, has led some border states to 
pursue their own even more restrictive practices, being branded as de-
Europeanization. 
Secondly, Europeanization as externalization has led to a shift of 
responsibility for refugees to non-EU countries, which are usually less 
resourced and with less developed asylum systems. On the one hand it has 
been made near to impossible to reach European soil ‘normally’, through the 
adoption of EU visa requirements and carrier sanctions, where the former fails 
to make any provisions for the special circumstances of refugees and the latter 
has led to a privatization of border control. Furthermore, through the 
widespread acceptance of the safe-third-country principle and the conclusion 
of readmission agreements, this risk of refoulement has become very topical. Also 
the joint interception operations by Frontex, the community organization for 
the coordination of border protection, should be seen in the light of 
externalization of responsibility. The intercepting of third-country nationals 
without establishing their legal status in the territorial waters of third states 
does severely curb the mobility of refugees, just as travel document 
requirements, carrier sanction and safe-third country rules do. In this light of 
the deterioration of refugee protection, the painstaking silence of Frontex on 
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the mere existence of refugees is most remarkable for an organization that 
deals with the protection of external borders. 
From a theoretical point of view, it has been argued that the harmful 
nature of the partial-Europeanization process can be traced back to exogenous 
pressure like the increased influx of asylum seekers and the growth in cross-
border crime in combination with functional spillover effects, chiefly the 
abolition of internal borders. In addition liberal intergovernmentalism has 
prevailed, as Member States have been careful only to transfer a minimal 
amount of sovereignty, and have tried to deal with migration issues in the 
intergovernmental second pillar as much as possible. Also, powerful member 
states have been able to push through their preferences, like the push by 
Germany to grant the EU competence to conclude readmission agreements 
and enshrining the safe-third-country principle in one of the directives.  
On a more precautionary note, the creation of a common European 
asylum system is ‘work in progress’. It was only recently that unanimity voting 
was abandoned, the Commission was granted the exclusive right of initiative, 
and the EP the right to co-decide. This happened right at the time that Europe 
ended up in a severe crisis, with the Dutch and French “No” against the 
Constitutional Treaty. The new Frontex Regulation has shown the positive 
impact co-decision can have as it at least includes the explicit protection of 
refugees. As yet however, the Court still does not have full competences, and 
most issues concerning asylum are dealt with in the second pillar. In addition, 
the historical institutional wisdom applies that ‘institutions are sticky’ and that 
decisions once taken are difficult to overturn. And thus ‘the implementation of 
a ‘securitarian’, state-centred policy frame […], paradoxically, poses severe 
constraints on the EU’s capacity to develop a [true] common refugee policy’ 
(Lavenex, 2001: 855). 
It is ironic that the states that put up joint efforts after the Second World 
War to share global responsibility for those people in need of international 
protection are precisely those states that are failing to live up to their 
commitments under this Convention, and are now putting up joint efforts, 
through the EU, to ban illegal immigration, simultaneously shutting out 
refugees. Thereby the EU is threatening to cause a deterioration of global 
refugee protection, because due to the interdependent and fragile nature of the 
protection regime, breaches of international refugee and human rights law may 
encourage and legitimize similar trends outside the Union. I would therefore 
like to conclude with the words of former UN Secretary Kofi Annan:  
When refugees cannot seek asylum because of offshore barriers […] or are 
refused entry because of restrictive interpretations of the Convention, the asylum 
system is broken. And the promise of the Convention is broken too (2004). 
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